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Rubber Planting in Laos: 





A steadily growing demand for natural resources, especially in so-called Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NIC), implies far-reaching changes taking place within the global 
field of development cooperation and increasingly challenges regional power balances. This is 
especially true for the relationship between Laos, labeled as a Least Developed Country 
(LDC), and its economically and politically powerful neighbor China. Since the late 1990s, 
when China began taking a more active role in Laos, Chinese investment and aid to Laos has 
skyrocketed. At this point, Chinese companies are involved in all sectors of the Laotian 
economy, from hydropower and mining to agriculture and services. Rubber plantations form 
a considerable part of this investment, especially in the northern parts of Laos where several 
Chinese companies are implementing rubber planting projects. Of the $26 million USD China 
has invested in northwestern Laos, $20 million USD has been invested exclusively in rubber. 
Exports from Laos to China are expected to increase mainly due to rubber, with both 
countries seeking to increase trade profits to at least $1 billion USD over the next few years 
(Asia Sentinel Consulting, August 2, 2008). This “rubber boom” (Shi 2008) has strongly 
reshaped the economy and social life in Laos. But is Laos ready for such a fundamental 
change? 
This paper analyzes the changes and local dynamics set in motion due to expanding Chinese 
investment in the rubber sector in the remote area of North Laos. Therefore it takes a closer 
look at a rubber project currently being implemented in Muang
2
 Mai by a Chinese rubber 
company. The analysis focuses on the unintended consequences of development projects such 
as rubber planting, and then evaluates the farmers‟ resistance strategies to these consequences. 
 
Methodological Background 
In order to analyze the rubber project in Muang Mai, I adopt Norman Long‟s approach of the 
„interface analysis‟ (Long 2001) which provides an opportunity to look at development 
processes from a multi-dimensional actor-oriented perspective. An actor-oriented approach 
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 Lao for 'district'. 
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is based on the recognition that even under similar conditions social life is made up of various 
social and cultural configurations. Accordingly, it contradicts structural models that explain 
social change and development as resulting from external forces - interventions by the state or 
international bodies. Long argues that the various local actors are perceived as either 
beneficiaries of national or international aid programs, or as passive victims of politico-
economic interventions. Structural models neglect the fact that under certain circumstances 
“less powerful” actors can “make their voices heard” and thereby change the course of events 
(Long 2001: 12). To understand social change, a dynamic approach is necessary in order to 
underline the mutual interplay between internal and external factors and to recognize the 
central role of human agency and consciousness. Long postulates that structural models 
encapsulate the lives of the people thereby reducing their autonomy, whereas an actor-
oriented approach places the social actors and their agency first (2001: 11). It attempts to 
analyze the social processes in which heterogeneity is produced and reproduced, manifested 
and modified, instead of just looking at the structural outcomes of these processes.  
The „development projects‟ most sociologists or anthropologists (Olivier de Sardan 2005, 
Long 2001, Mosse 2005) refer to are projects implemented in „developing countries‟ by 
international development agencies and NGOs from member countries of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC). This study analyzes a different kind of project: a rubber 
project being implemented by a private Chinese company in a district in North Laos. The 
rubber project is also situated in a „target area‟ for a German NGO (Welthungerhilfe) and its 
rural development project. Consequently, there are several different kinds of social actors 
directly or indirectly involved in the rubber project: The national government authorities, the 
provincial and district authorities, the Chinese rubber company staff, the villagers, the 
Welthungerhilfe project staff, and so-called „hinterland‟ actors.  
Understanding the rubber project as an arena, this study analyzes the interface situations 
which occur due to the introduction of rubber planting in the villages in the Mai district. The 
concept of social interfaces (Long 2001) provides the framework for the analysis of the 
conflicts that arise during the implementation of the rubber project. The focus is on the social 
processes and the interactions between individual social actors. Nevertheless, it also takes into 
account the influence of institutional, cultural, socio-economic, and political patterns that 
make up the social field.  
In this paper I emphasize the agency of the farmers; i.e. the strategies they adopt in light of 
the conflicts that arise due to the implementation of the rubber project. Most studies on 
contract farming and rural development in Laos portray the Laotian population as unobtrusive 
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and obedient to governmental directives. On the contrary, I take the view that the recognition 
and appropriate analysis of 'peasant resistance' requires taking another look at common 
concepts of resistance.  
Several studies have elucidated forms of resistance “from below”. Chatterjee (2006), in “The 
Politics of the Governed,” describes the politics of resistance which stem from marginal 
population groups in West Bengal that mobilize and develop into what he calls a “political 
society.” In Muang Mai, however, an organized moral community that would think of itself as 
a “single family” (as do the settlers of a rail colony in Kolkata; see Chatterjee 2006: 57) is 
hardly observable. Rather, what can be observed are simple acts of opposition and more 
everyday forms of resistance. In line with Scott and his study on “Weapons of the Weak” 
(1985) I argue that the majority of peasant resistance practices are still widely overlooked 
since they do not meet the criteria commonly required for 'real' resistance methods, namely 
the collectivity and organization of revolutionary movements. Accordingly, I apply Scott‟s 
approach to my analysis on peasant resistance in Laos. 
The research was carried out during a three-month stay in Muang Mai, a district within the 
northernmost province Phongsaly in the North of Laos, from January to April 2008. It was 
integrated into an internship at Welthungerhilfe, the German NGO carrying out an integrated 
rural development project in the Mai district. The empirical data stems from qualitative 
research in eight villages
3
 in the rubber planting area, combining semi-structured focused 
interviews and group discussions, participatory observations, visits of rubber plantations, and 
subsequent ethnographic conversations with various stakeholders. During the research and 
writing process, I considered the „Grounded Theory‟4 as an appropriate conception from 
which to establish the connection between theory and empiricism. In Alasuutari‟s words, I 
applied an approach that “instead of hypothesis-listing in the beginning, proceeds by pointing 
out mysteries and by gradually developing questions and answers” (Alasuutari 1995) during 
the research and writing process. 
In the present paper I elaborate on the local dynamics set in motion by Chinese investments 
in rubber development in the North of Laos. I start off with a brief introduction of the socio-
political situation of Laos and the government‟s national development directives from 2006 to 
2010. Next, I describe the background of the rubber project in Muang Mai. The analysis of 
the rubber project then focuses on the conflicts that occur and are exacerbated in the villages 
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due to the rubber project such as the problems associated with a lack of cultivatable land and 
food security. Finally, I analyze the strategies the villagers develop during the 
implementation process of the rubber project. The paper concludes with a discussion of forms 
of peasant resistance in Laos. 
 
Development Politics in Laos  
With a per capita income of $460 USD (2005), Laos is categorized as one of the fifty Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) in the world. While being a country rich in natural resources 
such as water, fertile soils and forests, plus being surrounded by dynamically developing 
neighboring countries, Laos, however, has for the most part been cut off from the economic 
development of Southeast Asia (see Haberecht 2009:21ff.; Lao People‟s Democratic Republic 
2003: 29; Neudorfer 2007; UNDP 2008, ).  
Since the end of the Cold War, the Laotian government has changed its course and has 
aspired to lead Laos from a LDC to the central point of transit in the region. With these goals 
in mind, the government has been promoting rubber planting as a key strategy to alleviate 
poverty and boost the national economy through foreign investment (Lao People‟s 
Democratic Republic 2006). In essence, the rapid expansion of rubber plantations instituted 
by Chinese investors in northern Laos reflects the extensive socio-economic change that the 
country is currently undergoing: The transformation from subsistence production based on 
rice cultivation to market production based on contract farming with (foreign) private 
investors. 
The specific feature of the Laotian situation is its combination of a market economy and 
socialist politics. While the country's leaders foresee a complete change in economic, social 
and cultural matters, the political sphere has so far remained lodged in socialism. Thus, the 
rapid economic transformation is taking place in a political climate characterized by top-down 
measures of a one-party rule and weak civil society structures. On one hand, the Laotian 
government formulates large-scale investment contracts with foreign companies, and on the 
other hand, it hesitates to allocate land titles, to provide credit for small holders, or even to 
register civic organizations. Critics argue that the unregulated nature of the Laotian system 
enables a few “unscrupulous officials and businessmen” (Asia Sentinel Consulting, August 2, 
2008: 3) to accumulate wealth at the expense of local communities and the environment. 
Altogether, the intended course of development causes great controversy in Laos and poses 




The Rubber Project in Muang Mai 
The province of Phongsaly consists of 613 villages with 26,000 households. With only ten 
people per kilometer, Phongsaly is the most sparsely populated region in Laos. It has very 
limited infrastructure and meager means for socio-economic development. From 1976 to 
2000, the population almost doubled from 99,000 to 174,000 people. Rice is the staple food 
and is cultivated on rain-fed farmland. In all of Phongsaly, only 200 hectares can be irrigated 
(Welthungerhilfe 2007b). 
One of Phongsaly's seven districts is Muang Mai. The World Food Programme categorizes 
the district as extremely poor and vulnerable. Altogether, 88 villages with a total of 4,600 
families are located in Muang Mai. The total population consists of 23,000 people 
(Welthungerhilfe 2007b). The majority of them are subsistence farmers who depend heavily 
on shifting cultivation and the utilization of forest products. According to the Welthungerhilfe 
project report, in some areas there is a high proportion of environmental degradation such as 
deterioration of watersheds and deforestation. Slash-and-burn farming, animal husbandry, 
hunting and gathering, wet-land and dry-land rice cultivation, and livestock cultivation do not 
guarantee an adequate provision of basic supplies from agricultural production. The increase 
of forest clearing for logging and the dependence on non-sustainable dry-land rice cultivation 
on the steep mountainsides only exacerbate the situation. Welthungerhilfe notes that the food 
situation is precarious: More and more often, significant seasonal rice deficits as well as other 
nourishments deficits (e.g. non-timber forest products) of up to six months are occurring 
(Welthungerhilfe 2007b). The Mai district belongs to the remote rural areas that the 
government‟s development plans (see Lao People‟s Democratic Republic 2006) target. The 
aim is to eliminate shifting cultivation by 2010 and to shift from subsistence to commercial 
production with a concentration on agricultural exports. Hence, rubber planting is promoted 
as a suitable substitute for rice cultivation. 
Officially, the whole rubber planting enterprise began with the signing of a contract (see 
Haberecht 2009: annex) between the Mai District Authority and the Thien Loui Ye Company 
Ltd. from Sipsongphanna in Yunnan, China. The project area affects 15 villages and 1,117 
people. The total area designated for the planting is 7,000 hectares and has to be completed 
within five years. The contract complies with the ‘2+3’ contract farming model which the 
government promotes and is most commonly seen in northern Laos (at least on paper, cf. Shi 
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2008). According to the model, the villagers‟ inputs are land and labor (2 factors) while the 
company provides inputs (capital, seedlings, fertilizers and equipment), technical advice, and 
access to markets (3 factors). However, there are frequently more than just two parties 
involved in contract farming in Laos.  
In the following, I will describe the conflicts which emerged and show what social and 
environmental consequences the rubber project implementation in Muang Mai had. By 
analyzing the implementation process of a concrete contract farming project, I intend to 
illustrate how development directives (formulated at the national government level) and 
resulting investment projects (negotiated between province authorities and foreign investors) 
actually manifest themselves at the local level. The analysis shows how different actors at 
village level (villagers, district authorities, rubber company staff, Welthungerhilfe project 
staff, and other „hinterland actors‟) clash with respect to different interests and hence 
negotiate and thereby influence the implementation process and its outcomes time and again. 
 
Challenges with Rubber Planting 
The rubber project is more than just another livelihood option for the villagers. Rather, its 
implementation requires significant changes concerning the farmers‟ entire lifeworlds. Rubber 
planting has deep ties to issues such as land management, agricultural cultivation, 
environmental conservation, and animal husbandry. Thus, it challenges the farmers‟ former 
practices in these areas and puts their autonomy and food security at risk.  
The inherent challenges found within the rubber project have a number of wider ramifications 
for the villagers‟ future. In this paper, the emphasis is placed on the different actors‟ interests, 
the specific challenges they face due to the project implementation, as well as the strategies 
they develop to cope with the situation.  
 
Conflicts over Land Use 
The issue of land allocation for rubber plantations most clearly demonstrates the contradictory 
interests present to the different actors. Land tenure is a sensitive issue in Laos. Most farmers 
in Muang Mai (as elsewhere in Laos) do not have land title certificates; thus their land use is 
based on little more than customary use. In most villages in Muang Mai, Land Use Planning 
(LUP) has been carried out by the district authorities in years past. Accordingly, the areas 
surrounding each village have been divided into protection and conservation forests, 
production and use forests, and agricultural land use areas. In practice, the villagers do not 
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always stick to these land use plans but instead develop their own land management 
practices according to the emerging needs. As the subsistence farmers depend heavily on 
cultivation areas and different types of forests, conflicts with land management are closely 
interwoven with issues such as environmental damage, deforestation, and a lack of cultivation 
areas to ensure food security. With the rubber project, a new dimension is added to the 




 shows that in 2007 most farmers in the rubber area planted rubber on fallow 
land formerly used for upland rice cultivation. But this data also reveals an upward trend in 
the cutting down of protected forests for rubber plantations. The district authority‟s 
guidelines stating that rubber planting is to be done only on fallow land have not been kept, 
resulting from varying situations.  
In Ban
6
 Three, the deputy Naiban
7
 plants rubber mainly on secondary forest land. 
However, “a little bit” of rubber is already planted in protected forests, he states. He 
further explains: “Our village does not have enough areas for rice cultivation. The 
rubber plantations are former rice cultivation areas. The Naiban and I have to go to the 
neighboring village to ask for areas for rubber planting and rice cultivation. My rubber 
area is in another village, I bought the land from them.” 
Ban Five does not have a land use plan yet because the whole village relocated from 
higher in the mountains to its current site. According to the Naiban, the company staff 
told them that they can also plant rubber in the protected forest but he himself refuses 
to let this happen. “We plant along the road the company constructed, but not in the 
forest. We still want to use the forest‟s wood for houses, sheds and firewood.”  
The Naiban of Ban Six states that until recently, they planted rubber and rice wherever 
they found suitable land. “Yes, also in the protected forest,” he affirms. Land Use 
Planning has been carried out in the village; however, the farmers still plant 
“everywhere.” The Naiban explains: “First, we made rules about protected forest 
areas, cultivation areas and so forth, but other villages used the areas anyhow, so we 
do it as well.”  
The Naiban of Ban Seven states: “In the past, rubber was not allowed to be planted 
next to the road. Now the Chinese company says it is permitted. If a village plants 
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7
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more than 300 hectares the company constructs a road.” Asked about cultivation areas, 
he explains: “We still have a lot of areas for rice cultivation, but maybe we also have 
to plant in protected forests once all other areas are planted.”  
In Ban Eight, the Naiban refuses to cut protected forest or watershed forest. “That‟s 
nonsense. If they plant in protected forests, then what good is Land Use Planning 
anyway?” 
Indeed, the empirical material reveals that in several villages LUP is understood merely as a 
formal procedure rather than an obligatory directive. As illustrated, in some cases villagers 
consciously ignore the LUP as it has proven to be more of a hindrance than an advantage for 
them. Others refuse to follow the company‟s instructions to cut down protected forests for 
rubber plantations as they profit in other ways from the wood. However, in villages where 
LUP has not been carried out, the tendency to plant in protected forests is more likely. Both 
Ban Seven and Ban Five relocated their villages and therefore do not have a land use plan. 
Notably, both Naibans state that the company also told them to plant rubber in protected 
forests. This leaves one to speculate on whether or not the company has consciously 
recommended this practice only where legal requirements are lacking. In some villages, LUP 
does exist but the farmers cannot maintain these obligations anymore as areas for agriculture 
are decreasing and they simply cannot find other viable farming areas. 
Altogether, the overall shortage of viable land in Muang Mai is a main reason for the 
conflicts over land allocation for rubber plantations. As illustrated, some villages in Muang 
Mai have an excess of land, allowing other farmers from other financially strong villages to 
plant rubber on their land. But those farmers who already face a shortage of cultivation areas 
and who do not have paddy fields face even more restrictions. Due to the rubber project, they 
have to use parts of their rice cultivation fields for rubber trees. Where fallow land and 
secondary forests do not suffice, there is a tendency to cut down protected forest land for 
rubber plantations. Farmers who plant more rubber over the next few years will face an even 
more serious shortage of land for rice cultivation. 
The lack of cultivatable land is a common problem throughout Laos. The national government 
attributes this to the practice of shifting cultivation (which it considers primitive, 
unproductive, and resulting in deforestation), and intends to tackle the problem by eliminating 
shifting cultivation by 2010 (cf. Lao People‟s Democratic Republic 2006). Hence, it defines 
the change from subsistence production (based on shifting cultivation) to commercial 
production (based on tree plantations) as a major development target for the rural regions. Just 
as the national development directives define commercial production as a substitute for 
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shifting cultivation, the provincial government in Phongsaly projects a complete shift from 
rice cultivation to rubber plantations for the villages involved in the rubber project. However, 
the district officials recognize that the rubber project exacerbates the problem of land shortage 
and thus they intend to considerably reduce the areas for rubber plantations. 
The Welthungerhilfe project staff is also concerned about the consequences the rubber project 
has on land management in the district. Altogether, the conflicts between the two projects 
result from their opposing courses of development: While the Welthungerhilfe project defines 
lowland rice cultivation on irrigated paddy fields as an alternative to upland shifting 
cultivation, the rubber project causes a complete shift away from rice cultivation and 
subsistence farming to commercial production. Thus, the two projects, implemented in the 
same villages, try to recruit farmers for two divergent ways of life. A frustrating factor for the 
villagers is that they are not actually free to make this important decision.  
The farmers in Muang Mai have for centuries practiced slash-and-burn farming for the 
cultivation of rice, their staple food. Now they are ordered to turn away from subsistence 
production and participate in a market economy by planting rubber trees. Apparently, the 
farmers were not and are not aware of the government‟s intentions for a complete shift. They 
know about the policy to stop shifting cultivation and they have a substantial role in the 
rubber project with the Chinese company. However, they perceive rubber planting as an 
additional component to their livelihoods that has to be integrated into the ongoing farming 
system rather than viewing it as their future trade.  
Accordingly, Alton et al. in their Para Rubber Study argue that “dependency on a single crop 
is counter to traditional mechanisms of most ethnic groups in Laos of spreading risks through 
diversification of enterprises. Additionally these monocultures contribute to the loss of 
indigenous knowledge of natural resource management” (2005: 71).  
 
Food Security at Risk 
In addition to the decrease in forested land for non-timber forest products (NTFP; such as 
fruits, nuts, vegetables, medical plants) and the dwindling land possibilities for rice 
cultivation, the villagers‟ food security is at risk due to the tendency to plant rubber as a 
monoculture. The possibility of intercropping the rubber plantations with cash crops was one 
option. Agricultural experts throughout Laos widely promote intercropping (see also NAFRI 
2005, Volume 2, Alton et al., 2005, NAFRI 2006). Intercropping has positive affects on soil 
fertility and it also reduces the risks of yield and price fluctuations. Furthermore, for rubber 
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plantations it is particularly advantageous to intercrop with cash crops because cash crops 
bring in a regular income, thereby bridging the time gap from planting until the rubber sap 
can be harvested (which takes seven to eight years).  
Most of the farmers plant rice in between the rubber seedlings in the first year, but 
afterwards the rubber grows as a monoculture. The villagers in question are neither 
informed about the possibilities of intercropping nor do they receive assistance with 
crop cultivation. On the contrary, most farmers I talked to mentioned that the rubber 
company has placed restrictions on intercropping. Many village headmen state that 
they are only allowed to intercrop with maize - no other cash crops or trees - because 
the company is afraid other plants would compete with the rubber trees (Ban Five, Ban 
Six, Ban Seven, and Ban Eight). Accordingly, some farmers plant maize as animal 
feed. In some villages the farmers state that they are allowed to intercrop with chili, 
sesame and beans, but the farmers either do not have enough time due to other tasks 
(Ban Four) or the soil is not suitable for these specific crops (also including galangal). 
The company has told the farmers that with introduction of intercropping practices, 
rubber yields would decrease. None of the villagers mention soybeans or peanuts 
which are named as suitable cash crops in the „district paper‟ (see annex). Only after a 
specific inquiry did the Naiban of Ban Seven explain that the district recommended 
soybeans and peanuts, but that the soil is not suitable.  
All the villagers who were directly asked about intercropping reported that the rubber 
company had not made any offers for other cash crops. Quite to the contrary, the rubber 
company staff apparently forbids intercropping because they are afraid that rubber trees and 
cash crops would compete with each other. Alternatively, the company offers to provide some 
villagers (e.g. Ban Seven) with rice for eight years - basically until the rubber can be 
harvested. Later they would have to pay the rice back in rubber sap. The villagers are aware 
that this arrangement would make them highly dependent on the company and state that they 
do not want to take the offer - unless they have no alternative.  
The rhetoric of the „district paper‟ on cash crops conveys the fact that the local authority 
would like an overall movement from subsistence to market-oriented production (as outlined 
above). This objective poses a great challenge for the farmers, especially during this 
transitional phase. The farmers have to bridge a time gap of up to eight years from the time 
the rubber is planted until the time when the trees can be tapped. In the worst case scenario, 
this would mean eight years in which they have no income and not enough time, labor, and 
land for other cash crop or subsistence cultivation. 
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The district paper's recommendations instruct the farmers to plant cash crops in order to 
receive an income that enables them to buy rice at market price during the rubber tree 
growing period. Once the trees can be harvested, the yield is assumed to be high enough to 
ensure enough income to get by without personal paddy fields. But the fact that the rubber 
company simply offers rice to the farmers shows that cash crop production for income is not 
promoted as a viable alternative. Moreover, the „district paper‟ also says that “the soil does 
not have enough nutrients for cash crops” (Art.2) and thereby contradicts its own initial plan 
to promote cash crop cultivation. An important question is how much of the long awaited 
income from rubber sap would remain with the villagers anyway, once tools, rice, and other 
costs of production would be paid back in rubber sap.  
Besides rice and cash crops, NTFP are of considerable importance to the villagers‟ food 
security. As rubber planting expands into forests and grasslands, it is predicted that the 
relatively poorer families depending on NTFP for food and household income will have even 
fewer options to ensure food security in the near future. Thus, instead of contributing to 
poverty eradication (as the government promotes) rubber planting as implemented within the 
rubber project in Muang Mai may indeed even exacerbate the precarious food situation.  
 
Livestock in Conflict with Rubber  
In its current phase of implementation (area selection and planting), there is an apparent 
conflict between rubber plantations and the grasslands needed for buffalo that has very far-
reaching consequences on the current village life. Livestock plays an important role in 
maintaining the livelihoods of the farmers in Muang Mai (and elsewhere in rural Laos). 
Poorer farmers in particular see livestock as an important means of poverty reduction. For the 
farmers in Muang Mai, cattle and buffalo are important sources of income in times of a weak 
rice harvest. Moreover, the buffalo is a status symbol in the villages. It is striking that, among 
the villages, those with a greater number of buffalos are those who are better off in many 
respects. Hence, cattle and buffalo are important for the villagers both in economic and 
cultural respects. The rubber project brings along with it a drastic change regarding animal 
husbandry. 
The rubber contract forbids the farmers to raise their animals (cows, buffalos, goats, horses, 
and others) in the rubber planting areas (Art.6). If a rubber tree is destroyed by an animal, the 
farmer has to pay a considerable amount for the damage, namely $5 for a one-year-old plant, 
$10 for a two-year-old plant and $5 more for each year the rubber tree has grown. In its paper 
the district authority reports that animals are not allowed to have access to rubber plantations. 
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The paper instructs the village headman and the villagers to “ensure appropriate planning for 
their animal husbandry.”  
The research shows that the villagers do not receive any advice on how to set up an 
appropriate animal husbandry system within the context of rubber planting. In the past, 
livestock versus cultivating area conflicts appeared as well, but they were reconciled between 
the villagers themselves. When the animals would wander into rice cultivation areas in the 
highlands and destroyed or ate rice, the rice farmer and the cattle owner jointly negotiated a 
solution, the Naiban of Ban Four reports. Usually, those farmers who had fenced in their 
fields got a higher compensation, he explains. According to him, problems only occurred if 
the animal owner could not be identified; in that case, the rice farmer had to bear the costs of 
the damage himself.  
However, since the start of the rubber project, the farmers are more and more concerned about 
their cattle and the potential for damage caused by the cattle on the rubber plantations. During 
the interviews they even asked me whether I could give them advice on how to do animal 
husbandry in the context of rubber planting. Some farmers have brought their buffaloes to 
other villages that have not planted rubber because they do not have any grasslands left for 
them (Ban Two, Ban Four). Other villages have already sold all of their herds of cattle. A 
farmer in Ban Five reports:  
“Earlier we had 50 cows. The Chinese company told us that we have to sell our 
animals. If a family does not sell their animals and the animals eat the rubber, the 
family has to pay a lot of money. We do not have a choice in the matter. Now it is 
getting worse for us because we have already spent the cash.” 
Those villages that still have their buffaloes or cows are thinking about selling them because 
they either are not able to put up a fence (because of roads or a lack of materials) or do not 
have enough manpower left to maintain the buffalo herds. Others are still able to separate 
their rubber area from other land, but in the future might not have enough grassland left due to 
the expansion of rubber plantations. The buffalo-rubber conflict is a serious issue in all the 
villages studied. Several problems arise if the buffaloes are sold. The Naiban of Ban Six 
outlines the triple role buffaloes play in the farmers‟ livelihood: (1) working animals on the 
paddy fields, (2) a source of income and, (3) producers of fertilizer for the paddy fields.  
The issue is clearer against the backdrop of the district policy regarding animal husbandry and 
agricultural areas. “This is not a new problem,” the deputy head of the district authority 
explains in an interview. Over the last twenty years, buffaloes have been raised in several 
villages without any regulations. Now the district authority wants to limit buffalo husbandry 
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to business purposes only and plans to set up specific „buffalo zones.‟ “Some villages have 
wide grasslands and all villagers invest in buffalo husbandry for their profession. In these 
villages we don‟t want to plant rubber anymore. In other villages we want to set up „cash crop 
zones.‟ No buffaloes should be raised in those villages. Crop cultivation clashes with buffalo 
husbandry.”  
The idea of different zones for different forms of production resembles the national 
government‟s „master plan for northern development‟ which is at present in formation in 
Laos‟ capital city Vientiane. It receives input from the highest provincial officials of nine 
provinces in the North of Laos. The plan provides for the establishment of key areas for 
industrial development in the northern regions including hydropower, export, trade, tourism, 
mining, agriculture, and forestry for processing purposes (Vientiane Times, July 3, 2008). 
Furthermore, the plan defines which regions shall concentrate on which businesses: “Luang 
Prabang province will be the economic hub of the north, with Xayaboury designated as a rice-
producing province to supply the rest of the Northern provinces. Oudomxay province will 
focus on producing vegetable crops and beef, while Xieng Khuang province will undertake 
animal breeding” (ibid.). What the district officials have in mind for Muang Mai seems to be a 
smaller version of the national directive for the whole of North Laos. 
Remarkably, the villagers do not seem to be aware of the local authority's intended changes. 
As in the case of rubber planting, the zoning plans are made without involving the villagers in 
the decision-making process. The Naiban of Ban Six states, for example, that he would prefer 
a concentration on livestock rather than on rubber planting. The buffaloes and cattle are of 
high value for the villagers and they complain about the serious disadvantages related to the 
loss of their cattle and buffalo. 
 
Hindrances to Private Rubber Planting  
Private rubber planting is perceived as a favored alternative to planting rubber under contract. 
However, the autonomy associated with private planting is only feasible for a handful of 
farmers. Individual relationships and networks play a major role both in extending local 
knowledge and in gaining subject-specific knowledge. Important actors that help to foster and 
create these connections are „hinterland‟ actors. These are relatives and friends from China or 
other provinces in Laos who have experience in rubber planting both as a personal investment 
and with a company. They remain important sources of information for the farmers in Muang 
Mai and provide them with both material inputs and information.  
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According to the „district paper,‟ those families who have enough capital are also permitted to 
plant rubber apart from the company, but may not plant in the area under the company's 
control. Those who had already been planting rubber before as a personal investment in the 
selected area nevertheless have to now cooperate with the company. In this case, the company 
compensates the farmers with 8000 Kip (approx. $1 USD) per plant. The contract not only 
defines the terms for the selected „rubber area,‟ but also for the areas outside the project areas 
that will be planted with rubber. The farmers growing rubber as a personal investment have to 
sell the yields from their own trees to the company as well. These regulations cause 
indignation among the farmers.  
Throughout the villages, and for certain actors, there is a significant range of possibilities for 
gaining knowledge vis-à-vis relationships with other actors. The exchange of experiences 
among the „rubber villages‟ in the Mai district differs as well. Some villagers (mostly the 
Naibans) have pre-established communication lines with other villages and exchange 
knowledge and experiences, and use these lines to also collectively coordinate resistance 
against the rubber project. Other villagers state that they do not communicate on the topic of 
rubber with farmers from other villages at all. Some villagers also gain knowledge of rubber 
planting from other districts in Phongsaly province. 
According to the deputy Naiban of Ban Three, his relatives from China had told him of their 
struggles (regarding profit share) with the company and the contractual obligations. 
Consequently, he decided to plant rubber on his own. He states that he knows of rubber 
experts in Luang Namtha who will provide him with information about rubber planting. The 
case of Ban Three very clearly shows the conflicts that arise at the interface between private 
rubber planters and the rubber company: 
“We got the order to plant rubber,” states the deputy Naiban of Ban Three. “There has 
been a meeting in Muang Mai. The district authority and the rubber company wanted 
to know who plants rubber privately. Those farmers do not have to plant any more 
rubber with the company. I did not go there because our village does not want to 
participate. I would rather plant rubber privately but the district head said I have to 
plant with the company.” The deputy Naiban has enough income and the necessary 
information to plant on his own. Last year he planted 800 rubber trees and wants to 
plant more than thousand trees this year. He bought the seedlings from Oudomxay for 
12.000 Kip per plant, he states. “If I have to cooperate with the rubber company, I 
want my money back.” He reports that he had to sign a contract for the whole village 
after a village meeting had taken place. “We are all discontent with the contract. But 
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there is no alternative.” According to him, the contract defines a profit share of 80:20 
but later the company said it was 60:40. He does not know why and sees no 
opportunity to verify this because the Chinese took the contract with them. However, 
the contract is not as relevant for him: “I am not worried about the signature. I will do 
as I wish anyway.” 
Although his room for maneuver is wide compared to other farmers I talked to, he is still 
subject to restrictions from the local authority. He had to sign the contract even though he and 
other farmers in Ban Three dislike the agreements stated therein. He has to cooperate with the 
company even though he has already planted rubber privately. But he is also willing to mount 
resistance and enter into negotiations about the compensation paid for the seedlings. Ban 
Three is one of the wealthier villages; however, socio-economic differences clearly exist in 
the village. Some farmers have no income, depend solely on upland rice cultivation, and 
suffer from a lack of cultivatable land and a subsequent rice shortage. Consequently, they 
have fewer options, less room for maneuver, and less negotiating power.  
On the whole, it is apparent that the challenges that arise from the rubber project 
implementation differ considerably between the villages and the individual farmers. The more 
connections a farmer has, the better his or her access to potentially valuable knowledge and 
thus the wider his or her room for maneuver. The farmers with more capital have more 
options in planting rubber as a personal investment. Relationships and networks with other 
farmers and actors involved in rubber planting are additional advantages. Farmers with more 
income also have better access to knowledge as they can travel to gather information about 
rubber planting in other provinces and draw comparisons (e.g. Ban Two, Ban Three, Ban Six). 
But since the rubber company started its business in the area, the situation has changed for the 
worse, even for the more privileged villagers. 
Currently those farmers who plant rubber privately are forced to cooperate with the company. 
According to the primary contract, the provincial authority grants the company the “right[s] to 
monopolize in investment on plantation, buying, and processing of rubber in the areas 
stipulated” (Art.13). Above all, the „district paper‟ declares that even those farmers who plant 
rubber on their own beyond the project area have to sell their yields to the Thien Loui Ye 
Company Ltd. Therefore, the farmers are deprived of a significant alternative to contract 
farming. Altogether, the instructions attached to the rubber project have a tendency to lead the 




Villagers‟ Strategies Related to the Rubber Project 
The farmers in the rubber project area develop different strategies to cope with the challenges 
that result from the Chinese company‟s introduction of the rubber project. In the following, 
some of these strategies are analyzed with regards to the villagers‟ lifeworlds, their social 
networks, and their agency. 
 
Learning by Doing  
The villagers in the rubber area in Muang Mai do not express doubts about their insufficient 
level of technical knowledge of rubber planting. They are used to planning things on short 
notice and are not concerned about issues that are still some years away. In contrast to rice 
cultivation, rubber planting is a long-term initiative: It takes seven to eight years for a rubber 
tree to grow to a point where it is economical to harvest the sap. Consequently, rubber is not 
an interesting option, especially for older people without children, the Naiban of Ban Six 
explains. Most of the farmers in the district are more concerned with present issues and 
address questions about future tapping, marketing, or tree share with indifference or 
speculation.  
In Ban Two, the farmers are not sure who will do the tapping once the trees produce rubber 
sap. The Naiban, who plants rubber privately, does not yet know to whom he will sell the 
latex. In Ban Five and Ban Eight, the Naibans postulate that they will learn how to tap from 
the company. “I don‟t know yet. Maybe the Chinese technicians will show us how it works 
when the time comes” (Naiban of Ban Eight). The Naiban of Ban Four assumes that the 
Chinese technicians from the company will do the tapping themselves. The deputy Naiban of 
Ban Three who plants rubber privately states: “I don't know much about rubber, but I want to 
learn about it in the next few years.” He plans to get advice from rubber experts in Luang 
Namtha (Laos). “They do the tapping once, then I will learn it and be able to do it myself.”  
This strategy is understandable regarding the lifeworlds of the villagers. Most of the villagers 
have only attended school for two years and their agrarian-oriented lifestyle encourages them 
to rely on practical knowledge gained through life experiences. Many of the agricultural 
practices are passed on from generation to generation. They also gain knowledge by keeping 
an eye on other farmers, friends, and relatives, especially with regards to new ventures. They 
take notice of other farmers' activities, ventures, successes, and failures and make decisions 
accordingly. In doing so, they develop extensive know-how that helps them to deal with 
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varying challenges in their specific environment. Therefore, relationships with other farmers 
are a crucial source of knowledge for the villagers in Muang Mai. 
 
Pressure and Hope  
In some villages, the farmers express their sentiments towards rubber either as a passive 
reaction to pressure from the local authority or as a hope that rubber will improve their lives. 
Often, it is a mix of both.  
In Ban One, the villagers who were questioned responded with a quite passive attitude 
towards the transition from slash-and-burn to contract farming. “We do not know how to 
continue without shifting cultivation. We have no idea, it depends on the government,” the 
Naiban says. With regards to rubber planting he states that each family has to plant rubber or 
else must pay a fine of 800.000 Kip (approx. $10 USD) to the head of the district authority.  
The Naiban of Ban Four declares: “I have no information about rubber. If I do not plant 
rubber, the area will be allocated to another village for rubber. I plant because otherwise I 
loose the area. I hope that rubber will improve my future life.” Asked about what would 
happen if some families refused to plant, he states: “All families want to plant rubber for their 
future, there are no conflicts.”  
In Ban Seven the answer to this question is clear: “Bor dei.” – “That is impossible.” The 
village has its own technician responsible for rubber. He receives 600.000 Kip (approx. $73 
USD) annually from the company and five percent of profits from each hectare of rubber. 
Additionally, he receives a $100 USD premium for being diligent - he and another family 
planted 700 and 1000 rubber trees, respectively. However, knowledge about rubber is limited 
in Ban Seven as well: “Chinese technicians come to the village bi-monthly. They say rubber is 
good. I don‟t know much about it. I cannot say whether rubber is good or bad, but in China I 
saw that many farmers have rubber and a lot of money,” the Naiban reports.  
Ban Five has already held five village meetings about rubber planting. However, the farmers‟ 
discussion was limited to talking about the five instructions from the „district paper‟ (see 
annex) and further information was not presented. When asked about the villagers‟ opinion 
towards rubber, a villager states: “I don‟t know whether the Naiban has asked about that.” His 
answer shows that he may not have a personal opinion on the matter, and instead leaves the 
opinion making to a third party. Notably, he is a member of the village authority whose 
responsibility is to “control and create unity.”  
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Unity and Resistance  
'Unity' is not only part of the state‟s maxim8, but actually a key word frequently mentioned 
throughout Laos. The German Welthungerhilfe project manager states that unity and 
consensus are crucial aspects of the villagers' idea of peaceful coexistence. Indeed, I could 
observe situations in which this element of a cultural identity was reproduced on a local level, 
both in rhetoric and social action. 
On one hand, the principle of 'unity' is likely to explain the fact that no family refused to plant 
rubber in Ban Four and in many other villages. Meetings are held until a consensus is reached 
and in cases of doubt, individual interests are subordinate to the common good. Moreover, 
villagers refer directly to 'eka pab' (Lao equivalent of „unity‟) in their statements about rubber. 
The deputy Naiban of Ban Six, for example, explains that the lack of unity is a main reason 
for his critique of rubber planting. He has a relatively wide network of social relations with 
other farmers and has the possibility to travel around, gather information, and draw 
comparisons on rubber planting in other districts. Consequently, he criticizes the absence of a 
standard format for contracts with rubber companies. Contract agreements such as profit 
sharing can differ considerably between the provinces and between individual companies 
within one province, he explains. Furthermore, he reports that farmers in other districts have 
the option of choosing between several companies and contract conditions. Dissatisfaction 
arises from the lack of options in the Mai district where the whole area is controlled by only 
one company.  
The deputy village head also criticizes the district‟s „ordered recommendation.‟ According to 
the district paper, he is not allowed to sell the area already planted with rubber. Normally, he 
says, it is permitted to do this but parts of the area already belong to the government. And in 
Muang Mai there are no alternatives to the existing company‟s conditions. “This is against the 
human rights,” he concludes.  
As a result, Ban Six and seven other villages in the Mai district assembled to consider filing a 
complaint to the government. Members of the respective villages comprise an informal group 
of farmers who meet occasionally at the market or elsewhere to resolve problems and discuss 
strategies related to rubber planting. “If the Chinese company‟s power increases and we see 
no other alternative, then we will complain,” states the deputy village headman. In his 
opinion, it is possible to challenge the district‟s order and to renegotiate the five instructions 
with the local authority. In 2007, he planted 300 rubber trees and in the coming year he has 
                                                 
8
 The Laotian maxim reads: ‚Peace, Independence, Democracy, Unity, Prosperity‟ (Kotte and Siebert 2002:14). 
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made plans to plant another four hectares. “If the district authority‟s policy suits me, I will 
plant rubber. If not, I might plant stylo as pig feed.”  
 
Skepticism and Avoidance  
The Naiban of Ban Two issues a clear statement about rubber planting: “Yes, we do plant 
rubber, but as our own investment. The rubber company asked us to plant with them as well, 
but we don‟t want to. We don‟t want to be dependent on China.”  
The actual situation in the village, however, is not as clear. In a subsequent interview the 
Naiban explains that there are seven families in the village that plant rubber, three of whom 
do so with the company. Another five families started planting with the company this year. 
But they plant only “a little bit, because they are not sure whether they really want to,” the 
Naiban states. The privately planted rubber trees grow on a tract of land outside the 
company‟s „rubber area‟ which was formerly a fruit garden. “I have planted over one hundred 
rubber trees already. This year I will not plant more, maybe next year. We are waiting to see 
whether or not the contract agreements will be renegotiated and improved,” the Naiban 
explains. “We are not sure whether we can really earn a lot of money with rubber.”  
Skepticism is expressed more explicitly in Ban Two than in other villages and the villagers‟ 
background in decision-making seems to be more developed due to easier access to 
information. Moreover, pressure exerted from the district side seems to be less of an issue in 
Ban Two.  
The following interview excerpt illustrates the perceptions of and strategies against the local 
authority‟s influence [I=Interviewer; N=Naiban]: 
I Have any district authorities been here to discuss rubber planting? 
N  Yes, lots of officials have come here already and have talked about rubber. But 
we don‟t want to plant rubber.  
I  We heard from other villages that if they don‟t plant rubber, they will lose the 
land. 
N  Yes, if we don‟t plant, the land is gone. It‟s the same here. That‟s why we plant 
only a little bit as a trial. 
I  Farmers from other villages told us that they have to pay a fine of 800.000 Kip 
if they don‟t plant rubber. 
N  We didn‟t hear about a fine. 
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I  Did you get the district paper with the instructions? 
N  We have not read any district paper. 
I  Was there any pressure to plant rubber? 
N  Chinese technicians from the company have made an appointment with us 
twice already. But I don‟t want to, so I went to work on the fields. Now they 
don‟t come anymore.  
The Naiban has tried to avoid contact with the company staff as much as possible, even from 
the outset. Thus, he dodges a potentially difficult situation in which conflicting interests might 
clash. By avoiding contact he therefore defies the authorities‟ and the company‟s control. 
Where it is unavoidable to disregard company or governmental instructions, the Naiban 
fulfills their requests with a minimum of effort on his part. Instead of planting the whole area 
with rubber, the farmers in Ban Two plant only enough to comply with regulations. Formally, 
they fulfill the contract agreements, but the interests of the district and the company are not 
actually met. 
The strategy of avoidance is often adopted by farmers in the context of rubber planting. 
Several Naibans stated that they first attended the meetings on rubber which were held in the 
district capital, but later refused to go there as they did not agree with the contractual 
conditions and thus did not want to participate in the venture at all. 
It is apparent that there have been and continue to be many ways for the farmers to respond to 
certain circumstances within the rubber project. The next section analyzes these different 
forms of agency and discusses them in the context of peasant resistance.  
 
Peasant Resistance in Laos 
As my empirical data shows, the farmers‟ attitudes towards the rubber project in Muang Mai 
differ; however, skepticism due to a lack of experience and information about rubber is 
observable in all villages. As the study reveals, the villagers‟ notions of development are 
based on the principle of independence. According to my interviews, most villagers are not 
content with the profit share of the rubber project and would rather plant rubber privately. 
Several villagers state that they plant rubber either as a reaction to pressure from district 
authorities or because of the fear of losing their land. Others refuse to take part in the rubber 
project and subsequently mount acts of resistance. As subsistence farmers, they are not used 
to working with another party and sharing their yields. The villagers‟ self-perception is that of 
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“rice farmers”; thus, they can not imagine how they would survive without shifting 
cultivation. In order to diffuse risks, the farmers‟ livelihoods are diverse: slash-and-burn 
farming, animal husbandry, hunting and gathering, wet-land and dry-land rice cultivation, and 
livestock breeding are important sources of income. Their notions of development are based 
on slight improvements within their actual situation; they seldom wish for an overall change. 
Appropriately, they name things like better infrastructure (roads and electricity), more land 
for cultivation, and better access to knowledge and markets as wishes for their future. While 
many farmers consider rubber planting to be a viable addition to their livelihoods, most of the 
farmers I talked to cannot imagine it as their sole business, especially a business mounted in 
cooperation with a company. Accordingly, many farmers perceive the rubber project as a 
threat to their independence rather than a means for development. 
In his report about industrial tree plantations, Lang (2006) also mentions the hope of 
independence which resonates with farmers from other countries as well. The author cites a 
Cambodian villager: “We want development. We want projects such as health centers and 
schools. But we don‟t want development that turns us to labourers. We want development that 
we have control of.” (Lang 2006: 27). Studies about foreign investment contracts often deal 
with protest movements ‘from below.‟ Most studies, however, do not mention local protests 
against the course of development in Laos. Lang references Thailand, where protests against 
industrial tree plantations over the years have developed into individual farmer-established 
networks such as “Forum of the Poor” which collectively put pressure on the government 
(Lang 2006:25). The WWF study (WWF et al. 2008) discusses the opposition to Chinese 
investment interests in other Southeast Asian countries. The authors state: “Where a civil 
society is emerging, people have begun to voice opposition to Chinese investment interests 
[…]. In Laos, where there are no formal civil society institutions, there has so far been no 
public outcry against the influx of Chinese immigrants who accompany investments. 
However, public concern over the proposed construction of a Chinatown satellite city in 
Vientiane has been widely documented in various newspapers, newswires and listserves.” 
(WWF et al. 2008: 2).  
Seemingly, the majority of the rural Laotian population is perceived as unobtrusive and 
obedient to governmental instructions. In contrast, my findings from Muang Mai show that 
certain forms of resistance do emerge at the local level. These forms, however, are hard to 
grasp with common analytical concepts of resistance “from below” (on a grassroots level). 
Chatterjee (2006) distinguishes between civic community and political society and attributes 
the capability to “affect the implementation of governmental activities in their favor” (p.67) 
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only to the latter.  
“The rural poor who mobilize to claim the benefits of various governmental programs 
do not do so as members of civil society. (…) They must, therefore, succeed in 
mobilizing population groups to produce a local political consensus that can 
effectively work against the distribution of power in a society as a whole” (p.66). 
Such organized forms of resistance “from below” (within a “political society,” Chatterjee 
2006) might not exist in Laos (yet). However, I argue that less organized everyday forms of 
resistance do exist and can be effective means of asserting peasant views. In accordance with 
Scott and his study on "Weapons of the Weak" (1985), I take the view that the recognition 
and appropriate analysis of 'peasant resistance' (as I observed in Muang Mai) requires a re-
examination of common concepts of resistance. Peasant forms of resistance are still widely 
overlooked as they do not meet the criteria that have commonly been required for 'real' 
resistance, namely the collectivity and organization of revolutionary movements (see Scott 
1985: 292). 
”What is missing from this perspective, I believe, is the simple fact that most 
subordinate classes throughout most of history have rarely been afforded the luxury of 
open, organized, political activity. Or, better stated, such activity was dangerous, if not 
suicidal. Even when the option did exist, it is not clear that the same objectives might 
not also be pursued by other stratagems. Most subordinated classes are, after all, far 
less interested in changing the larger structures of the state and the law than in what 
Hobsbawm has appropriately called 'working the system... to their minimal 
disadvantage.' Formal, organized political activity, even if clandestine and 
revolutionary, is typically the preserve of the middle class and the intelligentsia; to 
look for peasant politics in this realm is to look largely in vain. It is also-not 
incidentally-the first step toward concluding that the peasantry is a political nullity 
unless organized and led by outsiders.” (Scott 1985: xv) 
Thus, Scott (albeit against the background of the Marxist debate about class struggles) calls 
for an understanding of resistance that takes into account (1) the “subtle mixture of outward 
compliance and tentative resistance”, (2) the revolutionary potential of individual actions, and 
(3) the material basis of ideological struggles (Scott 1985: 293). According to these three 
criteria, the forms of resistance I observed in the villages of Muang Mai will be discussed.  
 
Resistance Disguised as Conformity  
 24 
The first criterion arises from the social and political background in which the majority of 
peasant resistance occurs. In a social environment which is characterized by power 
imbalances and coercion, peasant resistance is unlikely to be expressed overtly, but rather is 
disguised as conformity. 
”For many forms of peasant resistance, we have every reason to expect that actors will 
remain mute about their intentions. Their safety may depend on silence and 
anonymity; the kind of resistance itself may depend for its effectiveness on the 
appearance of conformity; their intentions may be so embedded in the peasant 
subculture and in the routine, taken-for-granted struggle to provide for the subsistence 
and survival of the household as to remain inarticulate. The fish do not talk about the 
water.” (Scott 1985: 301) 
The majority of the villagers in Muang Mai stated in interviews that they followed the 
instructions related to the rubber project. However, at the same time, most of them criticized 
the project or expressed skepticism at the very least. Moreover, some farmers have even 
adopted strategies which allow them to officially comply with the regulations, but without 
actually meeting the other parties' interests - and interestingly, they communicated these 
strategies in the interviews. For instance, instead of planting the whole area with rubber, the 
farmers in Ban Two reported that they planted only a little bit to comply with the regulations. 
Thereby, in Hobsbawm's words, they are 'working the system to their minimal disadvantage' 
(Scott 1985: 301).  
 
Individual and Collective Actions 
The second criterion refers to the importance of individual actions for a broader 
understanding of peasant resistance. As shown, the farmers in Muang Mai conceive and 
implement specific strategies to address their discontentment with the rubber project. Some 
farmers "hide" in their fields to avoid contact with company staff and district authorities, 
others stay away from rubber meetings in the district capital, and still others enter into 
negotiations with company staff. All these acts are individually motivated and unorganized; 
however, in sum, they present a clear expression of resistance against the rubber project.  
”When such acts are rare and isolated, they are of little interest; but when they become 
a consistent pattern (even though un-coordinated, let alone organized) we are dealing 
with resistance. The intrinsic nature and, in one sense, „beauty‟ of much peasant 
resistance is that it often confers immediate and concrete advantages, while at the 
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same time denying resources to the appropriating classes, and that it requires little or 
no manifest organization.” (Scott 1985: 296) 
In addition to the multiplicity of individual acts of resistance, there is also an indication of a 
semi-coordinated, collective resistance in Muang Mai. Farmers from eight villages recently 
created an informal group which meets occasionally at the market or elsewhere to exchange 
problems and discuss strategies related to rubber planting. The distinctive feature of the group 
is its flexibility which makes it difficult for authorities to find and control it. Another 
characteristic is its persistence; the group intends to argue about the imposed directives with 
the authorities until they modify them. The Naiban of Ban Two concludes: “If the Chinese 
company‟s power increases and we see no other alternative, then we will turn to the national 
government.” 
”Being a class of ‟low classlessness‟ scattered in small communities and generally 
lacking the institutional means to act collectively, it is likely to employ those means of 
resistance that are local and require little coordination.[...] What is lacking in terms of 
central coordination may be compensated for by flexibility and persistence. These 
forms of resistance will win no set-piece battles, but they are admirably adapted to 
long-run campaigns of attention.” (Scott 1985: 297f.) 
 
Material and Ideological Motivation 
The third criterion deals with the relation between material and ideological struggles of 
peasants. According to Scott (1985), 
"[it] is impossible, of course, to divorce the material basis of the struggle from the 
struggle over values - the ideological struggle. To resist a claim or an appropriation is 
to resist, as well, the justification and rationale behind that particular claim. In Sedake 
[a village in Kedah state, Malaysia, where Scott carried out his fieldwork, A.N.], this 
ideological resistance is generally kept from public view, but it forms a vital part of 
the normative subculture among the poor." (p.297) 
The same is true for the acts of resistance observed in the villages of Muang Mai. In some 
cases villagers consciously ignore the land use planning, as it has proven to be more of a 
hindrance then a help for them. On one hand, this action can be explained by a simple 
material interest; on the other hand, it demonstrates a clear breach of the national land 
allocation directive and thereby undermines the government's authority. A similar observable 
connection exists between material and ideological motivations in the case of farmers refusing 
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to follow the company‟s instructions to cut down protected forests for rubber plantations 
because they have other uses for the wood. In this regard, Scott notes that ”it is precisely the 
fusion of self-interest and resistance that is the vital force animating the resistance of peasants 
and proletarians” (Scott 1985: 295).  
In other cases in Muang Mai, ideological motives are more apparent. The deputy Naiban of 
Ban Six, for example, explains that the lack of unity („ekha pab’) among rubber projects in 
different districts is one of his chief complaints about rubber planting. As previously noted, 
his dissatisfaction originates with the lack of options regarding rubber planting in the Mai 
district. If planting directives were the same in all districts he could live with it, the deputy 
Naiban explains. But since farmers in other districts have the option to choose between 
several companies and various contract conditions, he feels that the farmers in Muang Mai are 
being treated unfairly. In Muang Mai there are no alternatives to the one rubber company‟s 
conditions and the villagers are deprived of alternatives to contract farming. “This is against 
the human rights,” he concludes.  
All aspects considered I come to the conclusion that the farmers in Muang Mai – unlike 
outside sources report  (for example WWF et al. 2008) – indeed offer resistance against the 
ongoing course of development dictated by the government. Due to the political climate, 
criticism against national directives is not expressed overtly, and is at best hidden - if it exists 
at all - in institutional structures. I argue that this is all the more reason to take into account 
these heterogeneous and semi-coordinated acts of resistance. After all, the multitude of single 
acts of resistance (forbearance, avoidance, or opposition) signals a strong reluctance to the 
imposed changes.  
Finally, I agree with Scott‟s reasoning that understanding resistance solely in terms of 
collective, principled and revolutionary acts means ignoring the peasant‟s agency and, in the 
end, provides no more than an assessment of the degree of repression prevailing in the 
respective location.  
”More than one peasantry has been brutally reduced from open, radical political 
activity at one moment to stubborn and sporadic acts of petty resistance at the next. If 
we allow ourselves to call only the former 'resistance', we simply allow the structure of 





This paper has expounded upon the „rubber project‟ in Muang Mai from an actor-oriented 
perspective. The focus of the analysis centered on the standpoint of the actors involved in 
implementation at the district and village level.  
In Muang Mai the forces motivating the rubber project do not leave much room for maneuver 
or bargaining power for the villagers. In many respects, the rubber project is a nebulous 
venture. The project arena is characterized by a multitude of actors with ambiguous 
perceptions and conflicting interests. The actors differ regarding knowledge, power, and room 
for maneuver. The analysis elucidated the conflicts related to the rubber project 
implementation as well as the strategies the farmers develop to guard their interests. It showed 
that the farmers are not just passive victims of the imposed changes, but find their own ways 
of dealing with the situation. As the interface analysis revealed, the farmers’ agency comes 
to the forefront through multiple acts of resistance - individual or collective, heterogeneous or 
semi-coordinated, material or ideological in nature. According to their lifeworlds, the farmers 
adopt strategies of avoidance, forbearance, hidden opposition, and open criticism against the 
rubber project. 
Considering the socio-economic realities and the characteristics of farmers‟ resistance in 
Muang Mai (and throughout Laos), the pivotal question is not whether or not the rubber 
project succeeds or fails in terms of predefined outcomes, but rather how the various actors in 
the project arena, especially the farmers, influence the course of events and thereby change 
the pre-existing state of rubber development.  
In Muang Mai, initial perceptions have indeed changed. Meanwhile, reluctance to engage in 
the rubber project is not anymore limited to just the farmers. District authorities backed away 
from their initial enthusiasm and have brought forward an amendment to the provincial 
authority that would reduce the rubber plantation area defined in the contract by half. The 
provincial authorities, in turn, also slightly changed course and negotiated some regulations in 
favor of the villagers (see Haberecht 2009: 65). The Welthungerhilfe project facilitated 
communication through regular meetings of the district authorities, company staff, 
Welthungerhilfe staff, and farmers. 
Rubber planting is neither good nor bad in and of itself. If implemented in a sound way it has 
the potential to improve the livelihoods of many Laotian people. The same is true for the 
Chinese course of development in Laos. Chinese aid and economic assistance may give many 
Laotians the opportunity to participate in a market economy and to engage in a new, 
promising source of livelihood. But it needs to comply with the social environment in which it 
is introduced. The present study confirmed that social and economic changes cannot be 
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coerced. Laotian farmers, contrary to popular belief, have the means of showing resistance in 
order to increase their room for maneuver. Consequently, I argue that the villagers‟ agency 
has to be taken much more into account in the planning and implementation process of 
development and investment projects such as the rubber planting project in Muang Mai. 
Ignoring the farmers‟ means of creativity and agency is a first step towards reducing them to 
passive victims dependent on outsiders‟ guidance.  
In Muang Mai, the different actors recognized that the current direction of rubber 
development does not completely satisfy anyone‟s needs. Welthungerhilfe staff, district 
authorities, rubber company staff, and farmers have entered into negotiations about the future 
course of rubber planting and development. After all that has been said about the rubber 
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